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In this chapter, we investigate whether alternative methods of pro 
viding health insurance have consequences for the labor market. In the 
United States, public policy relies heavily on incentives to enhance the 
ability and willingness of employers to voluntarily purchase group 
health insurance for workers and their families. This approach con 
trasts with that of Canada, where all persons are eligible for a mini 
mum health benefit, which can be supplemented but not supplanted by 
additional employer-provided benefits. Effectively, the U.S. system 
bundles relatively high-wage full-time work with the health insurance 
benefits, while in Canada work and health care coverage remain largely 
independent. How these two disparate approaches to the provision of 
health care affect the labor-force decision, hours of work, and the com 
pensation mix is a largely unexplored subject, and it is the focus of this 
research.
Ideally, we would like to empirically model and directly compare 
the Canadian and the U.S. systems of health care provision and financ 
ing to see how each affects the allocation of time between market and 
nonmarket activities. However, differences in institutions and social 
insurance provisions, along with data limitations, make such direct 
comparisons impossible. Instead, we use U.S. data to draw conclu-
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sions about the two systems by analyzing two groups of U.S.workers. 
In the first group, members are covered by health insurance whether or 
not they are employed ("virtual Canadians") but, in the second, mem 
bers must work to obtain equivalent insurance.
Canada has a system characterized by minimum basic coverage 
available to everyone independent of work effort. Additional coverage 
can be purchased on a tax-preferred basis, either through the employer 
or individually. However, this additional coverage cannot compete 
with the minimum benefits, so the private insurance purchased repre 
sents a different set of goods and services. In the United States, a sub 
set of the population operates under a similar system: persons who 
obtain health insurance coverage through the employment of their 
spouses. If one spouse has insurance, the other's labor supply is less 
conditioned on and possible independent of the insurance decision. 
For our purposes, such individuals will be used to simulate the Cana 
dian experience.
Two aspects of the health insurance market are likely to affect 
labor-market behavior. First, because of problems of adverse risk 
selection, individually purchased insurance tends to be extremely 
expensive or to have fewer benefits relative to employer-purchased 
insurance. Second, employers usually require that employees work 
close to full-time hours on the job as a condition for health insurance 
eligibility. Taken together, when one spouse is not offered health 
insurance at work, the other must generally work full time to obtain 
such coverage.
The options of full-time employment with coverage and part-time 
employment without health benefits may create a particularly difficult 
choice for an individual who must provide both health insurance and 
home production for the family. The full-time alternative may be 
selected even if it results in a sub-optimal allocation of time in the 
household. Thus, by comparing two groups of married women—those 
covered by spousal insurance and those who are not—we can simulate 
labor-supply responses under the U.S. and Canadian systems and try to 
isolate the importance of this effect.
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EFFECTS OF HEALTH INSURANCE PROVISION ON HOURS 
WORKED AND COMPENSATION
The effects of employment-based health insurance on hours of 
work follow from broad studies of the division of compensation 
between fringe benefits and earnings. In competitive markets, firms 
will only provide a more generous benefit, such as health insurance or 
pensions, at the expense of wages that are lower than usual for workers 
of a given skill level. Evidence on the trade-off can be found in Wood- 
bury (1983) and Woodbury and Huang (1991).
Evidence of the effect of health insurance on labor supply has been 
inconclusive and has generally tried to relate health status to work 
effort. Women are disproportionately low-wage workers and, on aver 
age, are less likely to be offered employment-based health insurance 
than men. 1 Moffitt and Wolfe (1990) have examined the role of public- 
and employer-provided insurance on the work effort of female heads of 
households. They found that there would be significant entry into the 
labor force by women currently on Medicaid if employer benefits were 
expanded. They estimate that a one-third increase in insurance offers 
by employers would reduce Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) rolls by 6 percent and raise labor-force participation by 12 
percent. While this effect is largely confined to AFDC households with 
relatively high demand for medical care, the pull into the workforce 
from employment-related insurance also shows up more generally for 
female household heads. Other labor-supply effects may be present for 
another set of female workers, namely women in dual-earner house 
holds. In related work, Wolfe and Hill (1992) simulated the effects of 
mandated benefits for low-wage mothers under different health states 
and varying hours of work. Health insurance appears to create a stron 
ger work incentive than either a wage increase or a child care subsidy 
when these women or their dependents are in poor health.
Changes in labor-supply behavior are also implied by studies of 
job lock or immobility due to preexisting health conditions that would 
limit coverage or make workers ineligible for health insurance benefits 
in a new firm (e.g., Madrian 1994). Monheit and Vistness (1995) 
showed that spouses appear to take efforts to avoid problems of risk 
selection due to poor health. Among dual earners, if one is in poor
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health, the other tends to be the primary holder of employment-based 
health insurance. On its face, recent legislation also seems based on 
the assumption that labor-force effort and employment prospects are 
constrained in the United States by tying insurance to the job. The 
Kennedy-Kassenbaum Act of 1996 allows former employees to main 
tain their health insurance indefinitely at the full-employment-based 
premium, replacing COBRA legislation (Consolidated Omnibus Bud 
get Reconciliation Act of 1985) that limited this option to about two 
years.
Our analysis extends this research to the general case of health 
risks, rather than existing health needs, and makes explicit the mecha 
nisms that limit labor hours. Figure 1 shows the general case, based on 
the household production model of Grossman (1972) in which health is 
produced using time (h) and market-purchased medical inputs (M). 
Further, total time in a week is limited to 168 hours, so hours not 
devoted to home production (e.g., health production) must be used in 
market-labor supply («). Given the shadow value of nonmarket time, 
(w, usually the wage rate) and the market price of medical care PM , the 
budget constraint for health is illustrated by the line h^M^. If all avail 
able time is spent in nonmarket activity (Hl = 168, n { = 0), no medical 
care is affordable. As we move down the budget constraint, more 
hours are worked so more purchasing power is available for medical 
care but fewer hours are available to provide health care services to the 
family.
Because it can reduce the problem of adverse selection, group-pur 
chased health insurance is cheaper than that purchased by individuals. 
The lower price per unit of medical care paid for through employer- 
provided insurance rotates the budget constraint to h lM2 , allowing 
greater purchases of medical care for a given amount of work. Thus, 
the indirect purchase of health insurance as a component of compensa 
tion effectively results in an in-kind transfer of medical care to the 
worker because the benefits of the price reduction accrue only if medi 
cal care is consumed.
To obtain insurance, however, the worker generally has to commit 
to a minimum work schedule. This convention may be imposed on 
small firms by insurance companies to avoid expensive family cover 
age that is disguised as employee coverage. Because health insurance 
benefit premiums are somewhat indivisible, firms may also need a








Health production: H = H (h,M)
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large commitment of hours of work to cover the premium expendi 
tures. In Figure 1, we set the constraint at 35 hours per week. Effec 
tively, the budget constraint becomes kinked at this point and shifts by 
the amount of the subsidy (ab). The new budget constraint with health 
insurance provided by the firm is the kinked line h labM2 . Therefore, 
an individual may be forced to work more hours than he or should 
would normally desire in order to obtain health insurance. Any indif 
ference curve such as 1C touching point h with a slope flatter than the 
budget line represents such a worker.
We compare this case to that of a worker who has access to insur 
ance whether or not he or she works. Such access would have two 
effects on the budget constraint. It would clearly shift the constraint 
out because even if one did not work, medical care would be available. 
However, for our purposes, the more important effect is that the budget 
constraint loses its kink because there is no longer a need to work a 
minimum number of hours to qualify for insurance. Most of our atten 
tion is focused on the effects of removing that kink. Provision of 
health insurance through some mandatory scheme financed by taxes, as 
in Canada, is equivalent to this latter effect. The slope of the budget 
constraint would depend upon the exact funding mechanism for the 
mandatory health insurance scheme or the effect on net wages in the 
employer-provided mechanism and any differences in the relative effi 
ciencies of the two systems.
In both cases, the minimum hours constraint is removed and the 
worker may choose to reallocate hours of work. Given a high value of 
nonmarket time, the incentive created by the need to work full time to 
qualify for insurance is no longer as compelling. We would expect to 
see hours worked fall for a person who had previously worked too 
many hours for the purpose of obtaining health insurance coverage.
DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION
To empirically test the proposition that the presence of employer- 
provided health insurance can affect labor-supply decisions, we evalu 
ate the job characteristics of two samples of wives. In the first sample, 
husbands hold employment-based health insurance. In the second
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sample, husbands are not covered by a job-related health policy. We 
use a two-stage process to determine if there is self-selection of wives 
into jobs with health insurance and whether self-selection differs 
according to health insurance coverage of the spouse.
In the first stage, wives face a trichotomous choice of no work, 
work without insurance, and work with health insurance coverage. 
Using a multiple logit model, we estimate probabilities of working 
with and without health insurance for both groups of wives (husbands 
with and without coverage). The estimator we use is described in Trost 
and Lee (1984) and Lee (1983).
We use the first-stage results to create selectivity adjustment terms 
for our second-stage models of labor compensation. The signs and sig 
nificance of the selection terms provide information on whether self- 
selection differs according to the spouse's coverage. In particular, the 
second stage estimates hourly wages, annual earnings from the current 
job, and two separate indicators of the share of annualized compensa 
tion received in the form of health insurance. The shares consist of the 
total premium and the employer-purchased premium. We expect that 
the value of health insurance for wives whose husbands do not have 
insurance would be greater than for wives whose husbands are cov 
ered. We also expect to observe an inverse relationship between the 
value of health insurance and other compensation (shown as a negative 
sign on the selection term) if insurance is the result of deliberate selec 
tion. This latter is the well-known compensation trade-off required if 
labor markets are competitive. 2
The main advantage of this two-step approach is that the estimator 
is consistent with theory. The hours and compensation mix are treated 
as jointly determined by the introduction of the trichotomous selection 
terms that condition the second-stage coefficients. Further, rigidities in 
the work schedule are implicit in the first-stage estimation of work 
choices.
The main disadvantage is that the estimator does not allow us to 
measure the magnitude of the trade-off between total compensation 
and health insurance, if one exists. The effects of the characteristics 
that affect the probability of working with insurance are highly nonlin 
ear. Thus, measuring the unit change in compensation associated with 
a fixed-interval change in the selection term (or its underlying odds) is 
highly artificial. However, this procedure may still be preferred to
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attempts to estimate the trade-off without attention to self-selection of 
hours and jobs. Any trade-offs observed otherwise may be biased 
upward because only persons who choose insurance are observed, and 
their preferences for insurance are likely to be higher than those whose 
compensation consists of wages only. Additionally, the data we use 
have limitations for trying to estimate the magnitude of compensation 
trade-offs because we do not observe pension accrual benefits. Thus, 
we are forced to omit an important component of compensation against 
which health benefits could be exchanged.
Data and Sample Characteristics
Table 1 contains the variable symbols and definitions of the inde 
pendent variables in the first-stage logit models, the characteristics 
used to develop the dependent variables in the second stage, and the 
independent variables of the second-stage analysis. The data on indi 
vidual health insurance and labor-market characteristics were obtained 
from Round 4 of the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey 
(NMES) and the supplemental Health Insurance Provider Survey, 
1987. The NMES household survey uses a national probability sample 
of the civilian, noninstitutionalized population. In the provider survey, 
employers reported information on the kinds of insurance offered and 
held by household respondents. It also contains data on total premi 
ums and employee and employer share of total premiums. Individual 
data are augmented by state and county level characteristics of firms 
and state insurance regulations from Area Resource File, County-City 
Data Book (Census Bureau), and from state Medicaid and insurance 
regulation files. Area Resource Files contain a composite of survey 
results pertaining to the health care market at the county level and are 
produced biennially by the Bureau of Health Professions. State insur 
ance regulations have been collected annually by Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield. Medicaid data by state is made available from the Health Care 
Financing Administration.
We included persons whose job or family status did not change 
during the round (the quarter year) but, within this group, we focused 
on married women between the ages of 19 and 62 whose husbands 
were employed. For empirical purposes, this group was further 
divided according to whether or not the husband had employment-
Employer-Provided versus Publicly Provided Health Insurance 333
Table 1 Variable Definitions
Variable Variable definition (data source)
Dependent variables
First stage logit 
WORK= 1,2,3
Second stage 














RISK POOL (0, 1)
CONVERSION^, 1) 
TAX RATE (%)
Wife does not work outside home; works with no 
employer-provided insurance; works with 
insurance, respectively
Annual earnings/annual hours of work
Annual earnings (actual, dependent upon wages, 
weeks, and hours per week)
Annualized earnings plus annual insurance 
premium calculated as if wife worked full time 
and full year
Total annual health insurance premium as a 
percent of COMP
($)The employer portion of the premium
All other household income reported in 1987 
Number of dependents
Number of limitations of activities of daily living 
of the wife (health limitations such as walking, 
bathing, etc.)
Wife's age in years
Wife's race is Black
Wife's years of education
Wife is in professional occupation
Years at current job of wife
State where wife resides has a high-risk pool to 
covered uninsurable persons (Blue Cross Blue 
Shield data)
State has a mandate requiring conversion to 
private insurance if job loss occurs (Blue Cross 
Blue Shield data)
Tax rate applied to insurance premiums by state 
(Blue Cross Blue Shield)
(continued)
334 Hunt-McCool, McCool, and Dor
Table 1 (continued)
Variable Variable definition (data source)
MEDICARE CHARGE ($) Prevailing health care cost index by geographic
area (HCFA data)
PER K INCOME ($) Income per capita in state where wife resides
(area resource files)
MDS PER CAPITA (ratio) Physicians per capita in state (area resource files)
COUNTY POP Population of county of wife (city and county
data book)
MS A (0, 1) Wife resides in metropolitan statistical area
(large urban area)
SOUTH (0, 1) Wife resides in South 
LAMBDA Selection term in second state
based health insurance from his firm or union. Employment was by far 
the major source of coverage for all of these households. Only 32 hus- 
bands had health insurance from other private sources. 
The sample characteristics are described in Table 2. Of interest are 
the lower wages, earnings, and job tenure of uninsured female workers 
as compared with insured females. Since this table provides only the 
analytic variables under investigation, data on hours or type of insur 
ance are not provided. However, such data provide additional insight 
about the way health insurance may influence work decisions. As 
expected, there were differences in hours of work based on insurance 
status. Within the group of women who received insurance, just over 
80 percent worked more than 35 hours per week, averaging 39 hours 
per week. By contrast, those who worked without insurance averaged 
only 32 hours per week. Similarly, when dual health insurance cover 
age occurred, 45 percent of sample women chose an individual over a 
family plan. This contrasts with women who were the sole suppliers of 
health insurance to their families. Only 19 percent of these women 
chose individual coverage.
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SOURCE: Authors' tabulations of the 1987 National Medical Care Expenditure Survey and Health Insurance Provider Survey.
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RESULTS
First-Stage Multinomial Logit
Separate logit models were estimated for each of the two subsam- 
ples. For brevity, we describe only the results for wives whose hus 
bands worked with insurance. 3 Regression coefficients are reported for 
those who work with insurance (Table 3) and those who work without 
insurance (Table 4). These coefficients are calculated relative to those 
who do not work.4 In multinomial logit estimation, the signs of coeffi 
cients are not necessarily those of the marginal probabilities, so mar 
ginal probabilities are calculated if the coefficients are statistically 
significant.
The independent variables include both person-specific character 
istics and area or market characteristics. Some of these variables are 
excluded from the second-stage regressions so that they also fulfill the 
theoretical requirement of model identification. Statistical identifica 
tion is insured because of the nonlinear first-stage technique in which 
the selection terms are created.
Table 3 shows that nonearned income, education, and per capita 
income significantly and positively increase the odds of working with 
insurance (relative to not working) and without insurance (relative to 
not working). The number of dependents tends to encourage working 
without insurance. Some area variables such as per capita income 
affect both working groups while others, the prevailing Medicare 
charge structure (a proxy for medical care costs), affect one group and 
not the other.
Second-Stage Results
We estimate the second state as a function of personal and area 
characteristics. Personal characteristics include the number of depen 
dents, nonearned income, education, race, age, a measure of health sta 
tus (the number of ADLs), 5 MSA residency, and job-related traits: 
industry and occupation (MANUF and PROF), job tenure, and location 
(South). The education and tenure variables should account for a sig 
nificant part of skill formation on the job and its associated "internal
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Table 3 Multinomial Logit Results of the Work Decision of Married 
Women: Husbands with Health Insurance on the Job























































































a Marginal probabilities are calculated for statistically significant coefficients.
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Table 4 Multinomial Logit Results of the Work Decision of Married 
Women: Husbands Have No Health Insurance on the Job
Work with insurance Work without insurance
Variable
Coefficient Coefficient


















































































1 Marginal probabilities are calculated for statistically significant coefficients.
Dep var. = 1 
= 2 
= 3
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wage rate." The final variable in the regressions is the selection term 
that is derived from the first-stage results.
Tables 5 and 6 contain the results for the sample of women whose 
husbands have health insurance. The results for women whose hus 
bands work without insurance are presented in Tables 7 and 8. Tables 
5 and 7 present results for wives without insurance. In these cases, the 
attributes of the job that are estimated are confined to the hourly wage 
and the earnings on the present job. For wives with insurance, addi 
tional dependent variables include total annualized compensation and 
two compensation share equations. The first of the two share equation 
is the total annual health premium as a proportion of annualized com 
pensation and the second is the employer contribution to the premium 
as a proportion of annualized compensation.
An important reason to elect nonwage compensation may be its 
nontaxed status. If taxes, which are unmeasured but correlated with 
income, influence this decision, their effect should appear in the latter 
measure, which considers only the tax-shielded portion of the insur 
ance premium. Presumably, both the demand for health and the desire 
for a tax shield increase with income.
For wives married to husbands with insurance, no coefficient on 
any selection term is statistically significant in either Table 5 or 6. In 
the case of dual coverage, Table 6, we observe only the standard human 
capital effects on hourly compensation, earnings, and total compensa 
tion. MSA residency, education, tenure, and professional status 
enhance earnings, while women from the South have lower average 
hourly wages than other women. There is also a positive relationship 
between wages and nonearned income, which includes earnings of the 
husband as well as household nonwage income. Generally, this corre 
lation occurs because of marriage between persons with similar human 
capital and socioeconomic backgrounds, rather than as a pure income 
effect.
When we evaluate the shares of annualized compensation attrib 
uted to health insurance and to the employer's contribution to insur 
ance in Table 6, we observe an inverse relationship to tenure and a 
positive relationship to dependents. Earnings increase faster than pre 
miums with tenure, but education raises the premium relative to total 
compensation. The former result suggests the limitations of trading 
benefits for wages as total compensation increases. The latter result
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Table 5 Regression Results of Compensation 
Equations: Wives Without 













































































a The model contains a dummy variable for missing 
data on TENURE.
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Table 6 Regression Results of Compensation Equations: Wives With 







































































































































































a The model contains a dummy vanable for missing data on TENURE.
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implies more educated women may demand greater amounts of cover 
age on the job. We have controlled for age, the wife's disabilities 
(measured by ADLs), and other income sources. Thus, the link 
between education and selecting higher levels of coverage appears as a 
direct one. Such a link is consistent with research on consumption of 
medical services, suggesting that the higher productivity in health pro 
duction caused by additional education is offset by greater demand 
(see, for example, Newhouse 1993).
In Tables 7 and 8, we examine the outcomes for uninsured women 
married to men without health insurance. Since no feasible substitute 
exists, household demand for insurance must be met through the wife's 
job. These women should be more responsive to the offer of insurance 
than wives whose families obtain insurance through the husband's job. 
First, we look at uninsured women in Table 7. Again, we do not find 
the selectivity term to be significant, and standard human capital fac 
tors explain hourly wages or earnings (e.g., education, tenure, MS A 
residency). Earnings on the current job are also positively related to 
other income.
The most interesting effects of employment/insurance choices are 
found in Table 8. They pertain to insured women married to men with 
out health insurance. The selection terms are significant in all equa 
tions, those explaining elements of compensation and those explaining 
premium shares. In each case the selection term is signed depending 
upon the covariance of working with insurance and the continuous 
dependent variable in the second stage. All elements of compensation 
fall with greater values of LAMBDA, suggesting a willingness to trade 
compensation for access to health insurance. The coefficient of 
LAMBDA, the selection term, is negative in the equation explaining 
the employer share of total compensation but positive for the ratio of 
total premiums to compensation. Because the difference between total 
premiums and the employer share is paid by the employee, it appears 
that at least some of the net gain accruing to women who select longer 
hours shows up in the employee's (taxable) portion of the premium. 
Taken together, these results imply that wives who select jobs that are 
tied to insurance earn less than the would otherwise earn and receive 
lower annualized compensation than they would otherwise attain. 
Moreover, they are even willing to settle for a relatively smaller portion 
of compensation in the form of nontaxed employer spending on health
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Table 7 Regression Results of Compensation 
Equations: Wives Without Insurance 













































































1 The model contains a dummy variable for missing 
data on TENURE.
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Table 8 Regression Results of Compensation Equation: Wives With 







































































































































































a The model contains a dummy variable for missing data on TENURE.
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insurance premiums. When given the choice, women whose husbands 
are not covered on the job will prefer jobs tied to insurance offers, 
despite certain costs. It appears that at least one motivation for select 
ing such jobs is access to health insurance.
CONCLUSIONS: IT'S AS EASY TO FALL IN LOVE WITH A 
MAN WITH HEALTH INSURANCE ...
Our findings confirm the important work of Moffitt and Wolfe and 
the suggestions of others that labor supply is affected by insurance 
offerings. Women in the United States appear to have two options to 
obtain covers, the "correct" marriage or full-time work. Thus, the 
Canadian system appears to be less intrusive than the U.S. system of 
health care delivery, at least in terms of labor supply and, therefore, the 
household's optimal division of time.
While health benefits in the United States and Canada have both 
suffered from rising costs, the U.S. system also leaves prominent gaps 
in coverage (see, for example, Levitt, Olin, and Letsch 1992; Wood- 
bury and Bettinger 1993). We have investigated only part of this prob 
lem—the necessity to constrain hours of work to some minimum 
before a worker becomes eligible for health insurance. Indirect evi 
dence about the sufficiency of full-time work as a means of obtaining 
insurance may be discerned by comparing wives who hold insurance 
with wives who do not. Part-time versus full-time work also predicts 
the returns to education in the form of wages. Wages range from about 
22 to 23 cents per hour per year of schooling for wives working with 
out insurance (Tables 5 and 7). In contrast, for other wives, a year of 
schooling generates 36 to 50 cents extra an hour (Tables 6 and 8). 
Arguing that obtaining insurance through full-time work is a viable 
option for all women may be equivalent to arguing that all women can 
attain high-wage jobs.
What we have been able to demonstrate is that health insurance 
affects the labor-supply decision and that a trade-off appears to occur 
between insurance and wage compensation—at least for one U.S. pop 
ulation subgroup, wives who are the sole source of health insurance for
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their families. Presumably, they represent the conditions under which 
the majority of U.S. workers operate.
Since their complement, wives whose husbands have health insur 
ance, depict the Canadian case, we conclude that at least some Canadi 
ans are likely to choose to work fewer hours than their U.S. counter 
parts, other things equal. The equality of other things depends particu 
larly upon whether, in which direction, and by how much the health 
insurance financing scheme in Canada affects labor compensation. 
Crude evidence suggests that U.S. workers do spend more time than 
Canadians in labor supply. If a part of this extra effort results from 
constraints of the health delivery system, social welfare is also 
reduced.
Notes
The views in this chapter do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. General Account 
ing Office. We are indebted to William Alpert and Paul Menchik, whose careful com 
ments and advice contributed substantially to the development of this chapter.
1. In fact, more women than men are covered by health insurance in the United 
States. The disproportionate coverage by women occurs through public coverage. 
Adult enrollers in Medicaid and Medicare are disproportionately female, and 
women are more often than men covered as dependents on group policies.
2. Until recently, little empirical evidence has supported its existence. High-wage 
workers also tend to have generous benefits, and it is difficult to disentangle all 
aspects of employment in secondary databases (see Ehrenberg and Smith 1983).
3. In the example we present, we do not deal with issues of joint labor supply by 
family members. Instead, we act as if male labor supply decision is predeter 
mined and see how this insurance coverage affects the wife's decision to work.
4. We also tested the effect of the husband's health insurance coverage on the wife's 
labor supply using an alternative multinomial choice model. All wives were 
pooled and the choices they faced involved full-time work, part-time work, and no 
work. A dichotomous variable for the insurance status of the husband was 
included as an explanatory variable. Coverage for the husband was found to be a 
significant inverse predictor of female labor supply. Because we can only observe 
insurance premiums for those who obtain insurance, we could not use such a 
model to determine if trade-offs between wages and health insurance exist, as we 
can in the alternative approach presented here.
5. ADLs stands for Activities of Daily Living. These include maintenance activities 
such as bathing, dressing, and eating. The number of ADLs is the number of 
activities a person is unable to perform and is therefore a measure of disability.
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